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Abstract
Humans — and artists — are capable of complex semiotic and experiential translations: we can translate 
reality, be it nature or culture, into an experience of sound, image, touch, smell, mime, emotion. We 
speak about ‘semiotic’ translation when we translate artistic work into another semiotic medium, when 
we translate the outer conditions of the experience — e.g. translating a novel into a movie, a painting into 
a song, a performance into a narrative. But before experiencing semiotic translation, humans experience 
‘synesthetic’ translation, moving beyond different possibilities of inner responses towards an artistic setting: 
for example by way of feeling, smelling, or hearing what can be seen. One holistic perception of artistic 
expression can be transposed into different modes, each one enriching the other. Both translations originate 
in the human possibilities of multimodal experience (e.g. blending theory of Turner and Fauconnier), 
cognitive fluidity (Mythen 1998) — both theories referring to complex neurological responses. Since long, 
semiotics has analyzed translation on the level of the sign or sign system, neglecting the (neurological) 
origins/counterparts of these processes. This presentation will consider the importance of the human 
synesthetic possibilities and integrate these into a broader account of semiotic theory (Kress 1998, p76). 
It will analyse the complex experience of an artistic manifestation realized by way of an ‘outer’ and an 
‘inner’ semiotic translation: at one hand an ‘outer’ complex comprehension which encompasses memory, 
cultural and aesthetic conventions, personal narratives, knowledge and expectations (Zeki & Lamb 1994), 
at the other hand the ‘inner’, rich synesthetic and multimodal cognitive and kinesthetic responses in body 
and brain acknowledged by recent neuropsychological and cognitive research (Spence 2001, Edelman & 
Tononi 2000, Thibault 2004). 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE qUEST FOR UNIVERSAL TRANSLATION IN THE OUTER 
WORLD
Humans — and artists — are capable of complex semiotic and experiential translations. Every 
encounter with reality, every experience of sound, image, touch, smell, movement, be it from 
nature or culture, can and most of the time will be translated into a meaning, an understand-
ing, an emotion. But every experience as such already implies some human transformation or 
creation, bound to our biological constitution and cultural context: an inner semiotic translation 
which backs up the outer semiotic translation. It is this last kind of translation or integration this 
article will consider: the inner cognitive and perceptual human means of meaning-making. 
Since long, even before the advent of the discipline of semiotics, humans dreamed of a 
universal and complete translatability of different perceptions, intuitions, experiences, of ‘per-
fect’ translation between semiotic systems. In the 18th century, French intellectuals like Court 
de Gébelin, trying to complete an encyclopedia on world languages, claimed that all the sen-
ses can be expressed in language. A painter only reproduces visual perception, a musician is 
limited to the auditory, but language, even if it does not represent vision, touch or audition 
directly, can reflect these by offering different descriptions referring to a multiplicity of sen-
sory feelings. Gébelin wanted to go even further, to find in the language itself the reason of its 
multiple sensory representations. This was his point of departure for writing a discourse on the 
origins of language. He broadened the limited phenomenon of onomatopeia (sound-imitation 
of form or audition), to analyses of phonomimetism, thus allowing language to go beyond the 
limitations of other semiotic systems, to find synesthetic correlations, to reproduce our expe-
rience of nature in all its sensory dimensions (Nye 2000: 142). The underlying supposed prin-
ciple was that our senses can be readily ‘translated’ from one sense to another. As we will see 
not a bad idea, and a current idea in 1th century thoughts: the idea that art and nature were 
very near, were linked in some sense. But it was liable to their search for all art as a faithful 
‘imitation’ of nature and less to an analysis of the biological, physiological or cognitive struc-
tures of the human being. 
Today, language still is regarded by many as an ‘interlingua’, a ‘higher-order’ strand of 
semiotic systems, a resource for fusing information from different semiotic systems (Matthiesen 
2001: 66). This means that language is considered as an overarching system or medium in which 
different semiotic systems can be expressed as well as an open field which can give birth to 
different perceptual sensations and semiotic representations. I indeed can describe a painting 
in language as well as I can have a visual impression of something I read.
Even if de Gébelin’s tentative failed, ending in quite esoteric thoughts about tarot and 
long dictionary lists of languages of the world, his presupposition remains interesting. The prob-
lems of outer translation are indeed still present. All artists, all translators, and even, on a daily 
basis and in different communication situations, all of us, are confronted with these problems 
when going from one semiotic system to another, when translating the outer conditions of an 
experience — e.g. translating a novel into a movie, a painting into a song, a performance into 
a narrative, a dialogue into gestures. 
In a previous article, I remarked that, since long, semiotics has analyzed translation on 
the level of the sign or sign system, neglecting the origin of these processes (Coessens 2009). 
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There is an urgent need to consider the importance of the human synesthetic possibilities and 
integrate these into a broader account of semiotic theory: «A new theory of semiotics will have to 
acknowledge and to account for the process of synaesthesia, the transduction of meaning from 
one semiotic mode in meaning into another semiotic mode, an activity constantly performed by 
the brain.» (Kress 1998: 76). This article wants to make one step into that direction.
Indeed, many theories have analysed the problem of outer intersemiotic translation 
— between different sign systems. But what happens behind the apparent semiotic separation 
present in our cultural world, in our ways of conveying messages, in expressing ourselves by 
different ways or channels of communication, separating our senses, feelings, acts and thoughts 
following the availing semiotic categories? Can we find some underlying conditions? The inner 
semiotic processes in the brain are the subject of only quite recent research in cognitive and 
brain sciences but can offer interesting background to semioticians struggling with the problem 
of translation. My hypothesis offers a revision of de Gébelin’s hypothesis, reconsidering the 
meaningful integration of different sensory spaces from a different angle, relying on recent 
cognitive, evolutionary, psychological and archeological research. But I will have to rely on 
the semiotic system of language to convey these thoughts. 
2. EXPLANATIONS OF INNER SEMIOTIC TRANSLATION
Artefacts and symbols, meaning, translation and understanding in the world are but the external 
realisations of a complex inner semiotic translation that continuously takes place by way of 
the integration and interpretation of different sensory input in our brain and its collaboration 
through/with our body. Two lines of discourse starting in different domains — anthropologists, 
evolutionary theorists, cognitive scientists, psychologists — have offered interesting accounts of 
how humans developed this flexible ability of inner translation and external creation of material 
culture. The first line is rather cognitively directed and aims at an explanation of the creation 
of material culture, the second line is concerned with perceptual information and integration. 
Both insights offer a basis towards a tentative approach of inner semiotic translation, which 
then can explain the further interactions between outer material and symbolic tools and inner 
meaning-making processes. 
2.1. Cognitive fluidity
On the level of ontogenetic development, the group-selection theory of Edelman points to the 
inherent flexibility of the human brain and its possibilities for adapting to outer conditions after 
birth: «higher brain functions are mediated by developmental and somatic selection upon ana-
tomical and functional variance occurring in each individual animal» (Edelman 1989: xvii). 
For Edelman, the phylogenetically developed possibilities fit into the ontogenetic develop-
ment and maturation of the human brain and nervous system. Otherwise said: culture fills in 
some of the possibilities of nature. The potential basis for organisation of and adaptation to 
the environment is the presence of numerous groups of cells in different parts of the brain that 
are variants of each other. As in many other mammals, a first selection of groups of neurons 
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takes place before birth. But in humans, a second, very important and intervening organisa-
tion and reorganisation of other groups of neurons, happens after the human being is in con-
tact with the world. A first prenatal arrangement indeed is followed by a second or postnatal 
arrangement when the individual shows attitudes of observation and interaction. Further selec-
tion continues by the influence of the experiences, the contingencies of and exchanges with 
the environment This clearly happens at a higher level than in other species and has a deep 
impact. This second neuronal selection guarantees potential organisation to the environment 
(Reeke & Edelman 1988). Thus a fundamental adaptation of the human body and brain to a 
relatively changing and polymorphic world can take place. This human ontogenetic develop-
ment excludes models and structures that are strongly predetermined and ensures that every 
top-down pre-disposition, be it genetic, modular or other, is always tributary to bottom-up 
impact — cultural and human environment. Biological evolutionary flexibility makes cultural 
creativity possible (Coessens 2006). 
Thus, even if the brain has some modular or very structured predispositions, there remains 
a lot of flexibility to adapt to different environments. But there is more.
Steve Mithen beliefs that modular parts of the brain became intertwined at a certain point 
of evolution. Searching for an explanation for the explosion of human culture between 60 000 
and 30 000 years ago, he coined the notion of ‘cognitive fluidity’ as an important development 
for the human species (Mithen 1998). It meant the human possibility of escaping a purely bio-
logical, instinctive way of life. Cognitive fluidity is the capacity to integrate ways of thought 
and items of knowledge perviously restricted to isolated cognitive domains: «modern human 
(…) minds will have a natural propensity to view materials from different perspectives.» (Mithen 
2005: 190). They made «the transition from a domain-specific to a cognitively fluid mentality» 
(Mithen 2006: 56). Mithen points to the fact that different domains as the social, the natural 
and the technical became intertwined as intercommunication between different autonomous 
mental modules started, fulfilling the need to process information about other social beings 
and their relationships. 
Cognitive fluidity evolved from three acquisitions: a theory of mind, language and 
material culture. In the first place, humans possess a theory of mind. This means they have the 
capacity of intentionality: the «ability to attribute a full range of mental states to other individu-
als as well as oneself, and then to use such attributions to predict and understand behavior.» 
(Mithen 1998: 170). We will consider this point further when exploring the theory of mirror 
neurons. Secondly, by acquiring language and representational faculties, knowledge and inten-
tionality could be shared, exchanged, tested and augmented and, as such, led to treasures of 
cultural knowledge which individual endeavour could never attain (Clark 1996: 206). Thirdly, 
material culture, as an extension of both mental and bodily capacities, increased information 
storage as well as creative interpretation and practical knowledge that could be used in differ-
ent contexts by different individuals (Mithen 1998: 184). Cognitive fluidity, combining dif-
ferent ways of processing knowledge and using tools, is a domain-crossing capacity in which 
the human being can not only explore and transform, but as well cross and link elements and 
thoughts concerning social, material and natural worlds. As such, it is a very creative capacity, 
which acknowledges for crossroads between the real and the unreal and from which emerge 
new, imaginative and/or metaphysical meanings and worlds (Coessens 2009). The possible 
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mental translations and inputs from one domain to another, be it the social, the natural or the 
technological, enriched ways of being, behaving and meaning-making. This cognitive fluidity 
has become part of human ontogenetic and cultural development: from birth, children are sur-
rounded with material and symbolic artefacts that are the result of as well as lead to cognitive 
fluidity — like dolls or bears. 
Our world is filled with objects and artefacts full of meaning and creation, realised out 
of these human flexible potentialities. Human creation and its cognitive fluidity thus led to 
what is called by evolutionary theorists the ratchet effect. But, once launched in the world, 
artefacts seem to become independent, loose from their makers and as such leading to outer 
problems of translation. 
The development of cognitive fluidity is an evolutionary step allowing flexibility of cross-
modularity or multimodal integration. Cognitive fluidity developments as Mithen describes, are 
then realised in two domains of materialisation: in language and in material culture. 
In linguistics, different authors point to the blend of different domains and inputs into 
creative sentences. Humans can dig out of two or more different source domains or cognitive 
spaces new outputs, with new meaning, thus creating a new cognitive space and new types 
of conscious thoughts. The cognitive blending theory, developed by Mark Turner and Gilles 
Fauconnier, accounts for the complex integration of distinct pre-existing conceptual input 
spaces into a single, new rich conceptual space (Turner 2006, Turner & Fauconnier 1995). By 
blending the concepts from different domains, more than just (re-)composition of this arises: 
new meaning emerges, an addition is made — a cognitive compression takes place and at the 
same time, meaning augments. New and dynamic meaning is constructed, relying on exist-
ing mental spaces with their own central and background meaning, but integrating these in a 
new way such that the integration gives rise to more than the sum of its parts. This happens 
in symbolical and meta-thought as well as in jokes or poetry. Verbal language as such seems 
to depend on the interaction between different domains, the flow from one cognitive space to 
another, realizing a new blended space. 
But cognitive fluidity is also present in material creations. Andy Clark with his concept 
of scaffolding, and before him Popper with his exosomatic means, refer to the extra-ordinary 
integration of and interaction between human outer creations and inner thoughts and acts. 
Material culture, as an extension of both mental and bodily capacities, easily increases infor-
mation storage as well as creative interpretation: «the potential for the same item of material 
culture to generate multiple cognitive spaces (…) multiple meanings (…) interpreted differently 
by different individuals in different contexts.» (Mithen 1998: 184). 
These accounts of cognitive fluidity and the cognitive integration of different spaces in 
the mind already point to a flexibility in human minds of possible translations which apparently 
act more as a blending of different domains or inputs. The boundaries between the material 
and the symbolical, between thoughts and acts, between the outer and the inner are blurred, 
or at least become vague. Cognitive and embodied connotations easily arise as the result of 
new experiences. Metaphors are often understood without explicit explanation — at least in 
adults. As such, cultural and other stimuli for human beings not necessary imply unique or 
predefined responses, they lead to a horizon of possible interpretations and creations, linking 
together different cognitive spaces and material/symbolical domains. 
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But there is another part of experience which remains in the margins of these views, 
namely the enormous amount of sensory input, of the different perceptual modalities and their 
integration in the neuronal circuitry. 
2.2 Sensory or synesthetic fluidity
Edelman’s theory of group selection theory is also concerned with the sensory organisation and 
integration in the brain, as perceptual input is primordial in experience. Moreover, studies of 
impaired persons show that the human nervous system has an enormous plasticity and leaves 
open an immense potential of different functions. Nervous channels, suited for eyesight, are 
used by blind people for more accurate hearing and finger-reading. Young children under four 
can, after severe injury of parts of the brain, continue their normal development because other 
parts of the brain just take over tasks to avoid a loss of function (Gazzaniga et.al. 1998). 
But haven’t we all some propensity of sensory integration and translation, of transgress-
ing the borders of our senses? Remember de Gébelin’s quest of an interrelated sensorial space 
which would become clear by analysing language. How is it possible that we have an evocation 
of visual imagery when we read a book? How do we internalise the space and time as well as 
understand and feel the bodily impressions of the leading character? Why do we feel sad or 
emotioned looking at the picture of an unhappy child? 
Let us start from Thibault’s observations on what he calls ‘connotative’ non-linguistic 
semiotics (Thibault 2006). In his research, Thibault argues for a biologically and ecologically 
sustained view on semiotics. Apparently, humans are inherently able to find a solution to the 
problems of local coherence of a sign system. This solution can be found in the integration 
of and exchange between apparently separated perceptual, cognitive and corporeal spaces. 
Human meaning-making indeed needs a multimodal and embodied activity in which humans 
deploy a cooperative synergy of sensori-motor modalities: «simulated inner movement cross-
couples with other perceptual and semiotic modalities.» (Thibault 2006: 82). Thibault presumes 
an integration of different levels of organization — neural, sensorimotor, biokinematic and 
expressive — into larger scale synergies. This integration is the result of the combination of 
at one hand perceptual, somatic and cognitive capacities together with the corporeal traces of 
previous social interaction — what he names the expression plane — and at the other hand the 
syntax and semantics of the socially developed semiotic system — the content plane of semiosis. 
Material and semiotic processes are always merged with complex and never wholly predictable 
meaning-making activity, be it socially acceptable translation or inner integration. 
But let us look at the internal semiotic actions that precede the possible external interpreta-
tion of semiotic objects or events. The brain integrates different channels with their respective 
messages into coherent meaning. It partakes in the human effort to create a unified or stable 
experience of meaning in which patterns emerge, as meaning is impossible in a world which 
is chaotic and totally unpredictable.
Firstly, in cognitive science, there is growing evidence of multisensory integration in 
which «the information processed by each of the sensory modalities — visual, auditory, somato-
sensory, vestibular, olfactory and gustatory — is highly susceptible to influences from the other 
senses» (Calvert e.a. 2004, p243). Beneath the primary unique sense-related neuronal pathways, 
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there is evidence of multisensory areas containing mixtures of neurons. The best known site 
is the superior colliculus, containing convergence patterns in which all possible varieties of 
sensory neurons are maplike distributed. Electrophysiological studies show overlap of different 
convergence zones in the representations of visual, auditory and somatosensory space (Calvert 
e.a. 2004: 247). Multisensory neurons are involved in many different behavioral, perceptual 
and emotive processes, leading to a unified percept or experience of an event or object. These 
convergence zones and multisensory areas make it possible also to complete missing senses 
or add to senses. Our brain fills in the missing pieces, sometimes adds pieces. Human activity 
implies continuously intersensory and multisensory cooperation in the brain: «Although the 
information arriving at the various sensory epithelia are initially processed independently, 
converging neural pathways rapidly lead to extensive multisensory integration in a variety of 
neural structures. (…) Given this extensive multisensory convergence it would make sense for 
our attentional mechanisms to be coordinated across the modalities as well.» (Spence 2001: 
231). Moreover, humans can transgress not only the borders of their own perceptions, but also, 
by doing this, transgress the borders of different worlds, as I mentioned with the capacity of 
cognitive fluidity, merging aspects of the social, the natural, the material, the living and the 
non-living.
As Merleau-Ponty wrote: «Synaesthetic perception is the rule, and we are unaware of 
it only because scientific knowledge shifts the centre of gravity of experience, so that we have 
unlearned how to see, hear, and generally speaking, feel, in order to deduce, from our bodily 
organization and the world as the physicist conceives it, what we are to see, hear and feel.» 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 229). Synesthesia is here considered as the multisensory horizon in which 
the different senses trigger each other, integrate on a neuronal level and unite in meaning-mak-
ing activity. Adding meaning to the world will again augment the world of meaning. Thus, 
looking at a painting, humans can have the experience of walking around in the painting, of 
hearing noises coming from the painting, experiencing the feeling of the brushstrokes, and so 
on. This synergy which takes place in human experience, in the exchange between the human 
being and its environment, as a multi-modal input and arousal, makes movies so ‘moving’ and 
poignant, music so emotive, stories so tactile and visual (Coessens 2009). 
But the activities of neuronal sensory integration go unnoticed by the perceiver, as long 
as there are no discrepancies between the senses. Moreover, by analysing and cognitively clas-
sifying our experiences, we often lose the awareness of a multisensory input and originally 
synesthetic experience in which a simultaneous emergence and intercommunication of the 
various perceptive and cognitive senses took place. By privileging the verbal in our analyses 
and descriptions, important and seemingly obvious embodied, perceptual and kinetic aspects 
of human experiences remain hidden for discourse and science. 
Secondly, a very related system of integration is the mirror neuronal system. The mirror 
neuron system is a multisensory system as it integrates different sensory stimuli and converts 
these into sensorimotor representation (Pineda 2008: 46). Mirror neurons have the ability to 
remap other’s motor states onto the observer’s motor representations. This means that, being 
a pianist myself, seeing a pianist playing, the same neuronal zones will be activated as if I 
played myself. Hearing somebody being very sad will activate the same neuronal pathways and 
areas as when I am sad. As such, the mirror neuron system shows that multisensory neuronal 
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processes integrate also bio-kinematic and sensorimotor processes and realise a synesthetic 
link with corporeal traces or embodied memories of previous social and individual actions 
and interactions. The mirror neuron system also provides a cue for some basic intentionality, 
understanding what the other does, thinks, feels, even if it is as yet not clear how the human 
mirror neuron system sustains complex human cultural behavior. 
3. COGNITIVE AND SENSORY FLUIDITY IN ART RECEPTION
Before experiencing semiotic translation, humans experience ‘synesthetic’ translation, moving 
beyond different possibilities of inner responses towards an artistic setting: for example by way 
of feeling, smelling, or hearing what can be seen. One holistic perception of artistic expression 
can be transposed into different modes, each one enriching the other. These translations originate 
in the human possibilities of multisensory integration and cognitive fluidity. 
Artworks are results of cognitive fluidity, cultural artifacts and social triggers for broader 
experiences which encompass memory, cultural and aesthetic conventions, personal narratives, 
knowledge and expectations (Zeki & Lamb 1994). At the same time, artworks are embedded in 
personal, cultural, natural and material worlds. Cultural codes and spaces help us to enter this 
liminal space. By way of learned experience, humans have internalised material settings as the 
museum, the ritual of a performance, as important meaning-triggering spaces. They are outer 
social structures which afford for complex synesthetic inner dimensions of experiencing art in 
which the borders of different worlds and domains are continuously transgressed. The objects 
or settings of artistic creation contain latent perceptual and aesthetic stimuli and can intensify 
phenomenal experience. The receiver ‘fills in’, ‘projects’ an own metaphysical art-world of 
experience by a subjective meaningful rearrangement of cultural values and personal memories, 
narratives and embodied feeling, fetishism and spirituality. Encounters with art work or art 
manifestation thus realize situations of transgression, liminal experiences, sometimes against or 
despite the intentions of the artist, sometimes recognizing and absorbing traces of the artist. 
My hypothesis then leads to the assumption that cognitive fluidity, and even more human 
sensory fluidity with its synesthetic and mirror aspects, play an important role in our confronta-
tion with art, not only stimulating our habitual perceptions, but surpassing them. When encoun-
tering an artwork, the profane suddenly takes a sacred aspect: it is no more the pure object or 
manifestation we encounter — as it is in and for itself — but our experience of it. Something 
matters behind, beyond the matter, an addition or unknown depth to the material world, we, 
as human perceptual and meaning-making beings, add. A process of signification comes to 
the foreground, a process which reaches out across the frame, the form and the content of the 
representation, a potential force of opening intense situations. The setting and stimulation, 
inherent in the manifestation of the art object or subject, moves the receiver, offering intense 
emotional and aesthetic information. 
The semiotic categories of the outer world and the inner integration of different sensorial 
and cognitive input should be looked at as complementary aspects of human understanding and 
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expression. The artwork apparently realizes a ‘resonance’, not experienced by other species. 
The dog will jump over the artwork or smell it, while the horse may recoil from it. Humans, 
however, by way of their synesthetic and multisensory capacities, are captured, moved by an 
artwork, and enter a situation of transgression, on the liminal regions of embodiment and cog-
nition, of perception and language, reality and imagination, realising complex inner semiotic 
translations.
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